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Abstract
To support the development and evaluation of
future function allocation concepts for separation
assurance systems for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, this paper presents the design
and human-in-the-loop evaluation of three feasible
function allocation concepts that allocate primary
aircraft separation assurance responsibilities and
workload to: 1) pilots; 2) air traffic controllers
(ATC); and 3) automation. The design of these
concepts also included rules of the road, separation
assurance burdens for aircraft of different equipage
levels, and utilization of advanced weather displays
paired with advanced conflict detection and
resolution automation. Results of the human-in-the-
loop simulation show that: a) all the concepts are
robust with respect to weather perturbation; b)
concept 1 (pilots) had highest throughput, closest to
assigned spacing, and fewest violations of speed and
altitude restrictions; c) the energy of the aircraft
during the descent phase was better managed in
concepts 1 and 2 (pilots and ATC) than in concept 3
(automation), in which the situation awareness of
pilots and controllers was lowest, and workload of
pilots was highest. The paper also discusses further
development of these concepts and their
augmentation and integration with future air traffic
management tools and systems that are being
considered for NextGen.
I. Introduction
The current National Airspace System (NAS) is
under stress and air traffic density is expected to
increase twofold to threefold by 2025. If not
addressed, this trend will lead to billions of dollars of
lost economic activity, increased safety risks, and
decreased system reliability and stability. Managed
by the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO), the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) is an initiative that addresses these
issues through a comprehensive and ongoing
transformation of the NAS with continuous
deployment of improvements and updates
implemented in stages between 2012 and
2025.
efficiency, capacity, and security, while maintaining
or improving safety, and to reduce the environmental
impact of aviation [1, 2].
To achieve these goals, new system operating
principles and capabilities are being conceived and
developed under NextGen.  An important area that
has received considerable research interest is the
development of separation assurance concepts that
involve significant changes to the roles and
responsibilities of the air traffic controllers (ATCs),
pilots, and ground-based and airborne automation
systems. The concepts vary by the extent to which
the separation assurance function is distributed
among pilots, controllers, and automation.  One of
the main issues that these concepts address is the
significant increase in the ATC workload that comes
with increased air traffic densities.  Automation, in
particular, is a primary means by which designers are
seeking to address this workload issue and thereby
safely increase the allowable air traffic
densities.  Methods by which automation can be
brought to bear on this problem may be defined with
respect to the relative degree of human involvement
in generating resolutions for conflicts.  A number of
current research efforts aim to develop automated
systems which detect projected losses of separation
(conflicts) and then generate conflict resolutions
(trajectory modifications), thereby, substantially
augmenting and/or replacing functions now
performed by ATCs [3-6].  For instance, the ground-
based automation tool developed under the Advanced
Airspace Concept (AAC) by researchers at NASA
Ames [7, 8] is designed to detect conflicts and then to
generate and transmit conflict-free routes (via
datacom) to appropriately equipped aircraft for
execution.  In this concept, separation assurance
could be managed jointly by the ground based
automation system and pilots, while controllers are
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mainly responsible for strategic management of air
traffic flow and separation of unequipped
aircraft.  An alternative to the above approach has
also been proposed in which the controller delegates
the separation responsibility to the pilot.  The
consensus view in the NextGen community is that
this approach would require advance airborne
automation in the form of a cockpit situation display
(CSD) and conflict detection and resolution (CD&R)
tools for separation management [9-17].
While the benefits of automation have been
shown, the exact roles and responsibilities of pilots,
controllers, and automation surrounding these
NextGen concepts are still in development.  In 2009 a
human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to help
support the development and evaluation of allocating
separation assurance responsibilities and workload to
these three entities.  The study presented flights
through and around weather during the cruise phase
of flight, and for which the differing allocations were
examined.  Previous papers have reported subjective
and performance data for the cruise phase in this
study [18-19]. However, each of the flights in this
study culminated with a final weather free arrival
phase down to the meter fix during which ATCs were
always responsible for separation management, but
there has been only a limited examination of how the
cruise phase functional allocation affected
performance associated with the arrival phase. This
paper presents a more detailed analysis of this aspect
of the study. Section II describes the design of the
three concepts using a human-centered approach,
Section III describes the experimental design and
methods of the human-in-the loop simulation used to
evaluate these concepts, while Sections IV and V
discuss
further development of these concepts, and their
augmentation and integration with future air traffic
management tools and systems that are being
considered for NextGen.
II. Design of Concepts
Three function allocation concepts were
conceived and designed with a human-centered
approach that distributes separation assurance
responsibility among pilots, controllers, and
air/ground automation.  Specific divisions of
functions were chosen to vary operator workload and
situation awareness, and to examine system
performance across concepts.  A set of common
assumptions regarding aircraft equipage, data
communication technologies, airborne and ground-
based automated decision support tools, and rules of
the road for conflict management were developed.
These assumptions include:
1. There are two groups of aircraft operating in
the airspace: a) 50% of all aircraft are trajectory flight
rule (TFR) aircraft, and have a cockpit situation
display (CSD) on board integrated with a route
assessment (trajectory replanning) tool (RAT) and a
3D-weather display [20] plus, in some cases, CD&R
tools.  Using the RAT, the pilot can manually make
changes to the trajectory; and b) 50% of all aircraft
are instrument flight rule aircraft (IFR) managed by
ATC and do not have CD&R tools.  In this study, all
experimental pilots flew TFR aircraft.
2. All aircraft have the capability to
communicate and exchange information with ATC
through Controller Pilot Data Link Communications
(CPDLC) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcasting (ADS-B).
3. Pilots of both TFR and IFR aircraft are
responsible for interval management operations [15],
using flight deck automation [11] to space 105 sec
behind an assigned lead by the final approach fix.
4. The ground and (when present) airborne
auto-resolver systems use the NASA Advanced
Airspace Concept (AAC) [7, 8] algorithm for
detection and resolution of conflicts between 4 and
12 minutes to predict loss of separation (LOS), and
use the Tactical Separation Assisted Flight
Environment (TSAFE) algorithm for avoidance of
conflicts less than 4 minutes to LOS.  The auto-
resolver tools on the ground and in the flight deck do
not take weather into account; thus, pilots must
ensure all resolutions are weather free.
5. To resolve a conflict, and if equipped, the
TFR pilot can use either the airborne auto-resolver on
board to generate a conflict-free resolution and check
for weather-free, or the RAT to do the same tasks.
Similarly, the controller can use either the ground-
based auto-resolver to generate resolutions and check
for weather-free, or the manual trial planning tool to
do the same tasks.
6. Rules of the road: When in conflict with IFR
aircraft, operators or automation must resolve the
conflict by changing the trajectory of the TFR
aircraft. For conflicts that are 4 minutes or less to
LOS, TSAFE provides conflict-free resolutions to the
controller for both TFR and IFR aircraft.
With these assumptions providing a baseline for
the operation, three function allocation concepts were
developed to vary the responsibility for conflict
resolution as well as the amount of conflicts that
pilots, controllers, and automation must manage.  The
three concepts are summarized below:
Concept 1: Pilot Primary, Controller Secondary
TFR pilots are equipped with a conflict probe
tool that detects conflicts and alerts the operator, and
a conflict resolution tool with which the operator can
either request algorithmically-generated conflict
resolutions or create their own conflict resolutions.
TFR pilots are responsible for generating reroutes to
avoid weather and for identifying and resolving TFR-
TFR and TFR-IFR conflicts with ownship. IFR pilots
are responsible only for verbally requesting reroutes
around weather.  Controllers are equipped with
equivalent ground-based tools and responsible for
IFR-IFR conflicts. Controllers managed all IFR
aircraft. When avoiding traffic and weather, pilots
self-modify and execute their routes and broadcast
their route modifications via ADS-B, thereby
updating other TFR aircraft and the air traffic control
system. Pilots monitor voice frequencies but will
only receive clearances from the controller if their
spacing becomes discontinuous and responsibility is
delegated to the controller to adjust. Through these
allocations, pilots are responsible for resolving 75%
of the total conflicts, ATC is responsible for 25% of
the total conflicts, and the Auto-resolver agent is not
responsible for resolving any conflicts.
Concept 2: Controller Primary, Automation
Secondary
TFR pilots are equipped with a conflict probe
tool and a conflict resolution tool, as they are in
Concept 1, but they are not responsible for resolving
any conflicts. Instead, they have the capability of
generating conflict and weather free reroutes, and
datalinking them to the controller, but the controller
must approve/disapprove or offer alternatives to all
such reroutes. Both IFR and TFR pilots are
responsible for requesting reroutes around weather.
Controllers are equipped with equivalent ground-
based tools and are responsible for generating and/or
approving TFR-IFR and IFR-IFR conflict
resolutions. For TFR-IFR conflicts, the controller
modifies the route of the IFR aircraft unless an
acceptable TFR resolution is datalinked to the
controller. An autoresolver agent, which acts
independently when responsibility is delegated to it
and datalinks route modifications directly to
operators, is responsible for TFR-TFR conflicts, but
does not take weather into account. While the
controller is not in the decision-making loop for
initial resolution of TFR-TFR conflicts, TFR pilots
can review route modifications made by the
autoresolver agent before executing them, and return
them to the controller if not weather free. Through
these allocations, pilots are not responsible for
resolving any conflicts, ATC is responsible for
resolving 75% of the total conflicts, and the auto-
resolver agent is responsible for resolving 25% of the
total conflicts.
Concept 3: Automation Primary, Controller
Secondary
TFR pilots are equipped with a CSD with the
RAT flight path replanning tool, but without CD&R
tools. As in Concept 2, pilots are responsible for
requesting and obtaining weather free re-routes, but
are not responsible for resolving any conflicts. The
autoresolver agent is responsible for resolving TFR-
TFR and TFR-IFR conflicts, but as in Concept 2 it
does not take weather into account. For TFR-IFR
conflicts, the autoresolver agent preferentially
modifies the route of the TFR aircraft.  Controllers
are equipped with a conflict probe tool and a conflict
resolution tool and are responsible for IFR-IFR
conflicts. TFR pilots can review route modifications
datalinked to them by the autoresolver agent before
executing them. TFR pilots use the CSD to generate
and datalink reroute requests for weather avoidance
to the Autoresolver but, if the reroute has conflicts, it
will be automatically transferred to, and subsequently
handled by, the controller. Through these allocations,
pilots are not responsible for resolving any conflicts,
ATC is responsible for resolving 25% of the total
conflicts, and the auto-resolver agent is responsible
for resolving 75% of the total conflicts.
In all three concepts once the aircraft reached
the top of descent, the controller became solely
responsible for separation, while the pilots remained
responsible for achieving a 105 second in trail
separation by the final approach fix.  The separation
responsibility and equipage assignment are
summarized in Table 1 below.






Pilots: Equipped with CD&R and interval
management automation, responsible for TFR-
TFR and TFR-IFR conflicts and spacing.
Controllers: CD&R equipped and responsible for
IFR-IFR conflicts
Auto-resolver Agent: Responsible for no conflicts.
Pilots: No CD&R, responsible for no
conflicts. Equipped with interval
management automation, responsible for
spacing goals.




Pilots: Equipped with CD&R and interval
management automation, responsible for spacing
but not for conflicts.
Controllers: CD&R equipped and responsible for
TFR-IFR and IFR-IFR conflicts
Auto-resolver Agent: Responsible for TFR-TFR
conflicts.
Pilots: No CD&R, not responsible for any
conflicts. Equipped with interval management
automation, responsible for spacing goals.




Pilots: Not CD&R equipped or responsible for any
conflicts. Equipped with interval management
automation, responsible for spacing goals.
Controllers: CD&R equipped and responsible for
IFR-IFR conflicts.
Auto-resolver Agent: Responsible for TFR-TFR
and TFR-IFR conflicts.
Pilots: No CD&R, not responsible for any
conflicts. Equipped with interval management
automation, responsible for spacing goals.
Controller: CD&R equipped, responsible for
all conflicts
III. Experiment Design
To evaluate the impact of functional allocation
concept used during cruise on system performance
during arrival, and on the workload and situation
awareness of pilots and controllers during arrival, a
human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation was
developed.  The simulation airspace assumes a 3-time
current day traffic density operating in both the
enroute cruise and arrival flight phases under the
three separation assurance functional allocation
concepts described above.
III.A. Scenario and Testing Design
Traffic scenarios were created with aircraft
being assigned an interval management clearance
(designating lead aircraft and 105 sec in trail) prior to
encountering convective weather in the cruise phase
of flight.  They were then required to avoid the
weather, and perform a continuous descent approach
(CDA) arrival from the top of descent (TOD) into
Louisville Standiford Field Airport (SDF) using the
CBSKT-1 arrival shown top-down in Figure 1.
The simulated airspace, modeled after Kansas
City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZKC) and
Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZID),
consists of two -
ZKC 91, which are larger than current-day airspace.
Super-sector ZKC90 was created by geographically
combining existing ZKC sectors 90 and 14, while
-
existing ZID sectors 91, 81 and 17.  This airspace
was then populated with additional aircraft to create a
3-time current day traffic density.   The traffic flow,
modeled after real traffic streams, encountered
enroute weather cells west of ZKC 90, and then
reached the TOD before merging and performing the
CDA in ZID 91.  The airspace sectors, weather cells, TOD, and merge point are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 1. CBSKT-1 Arrival
TOD
Merge pt
Figure 2. Airspace and sector layout
III.B. Independent Variables and Analysis
Metrics
A 3 (Concept: 1 - Pilot Primary, 2 - Controller
Primary,  3  -  Automation  Primary)  x  2  (Weather
Complexity: Low, High) x 2 (Cockpit Weather
Display: airborne radar, 3D NexRad) fully within-
subjects factorial design was used.  Specific numbers
of TFR and IFR aircraft were designed into the
scenarios to generate the following divisions of
responsible conflicts count: 75% of conflicts to Pilots
and 25% to Controllers for Concept 1; 75% of
conflicts to Controllers and 25% to Automation for
Concept 2; and 75% of conflicts to Automation and
25% to Controllers for Concept 3.  Low weather
density had fewer and sparser weather cells, while
high weather density had greater and denser weather
cells.  However, in the analysis of this paper, neither
the Weather Complexity nor Cockpit Weather
Display manipulations are examined, and will not be
further mentioned.  Twelve trials were conducted,
one for each unique set of conditions. The CSD
provided pilots with 3D and 2D spatial orientations
of traffic information.
Five types of data were collected to help
quantify the effects of the function allocation during
the arrival portion of the simulation: situation
awareness data, aircraft trajectory data, voice data,
workload data, and subjective ratings.  Based on
these data, a number of metrics were developed to
quantify system performance and human factors
performance.  System performance, defined in terms
with safety, was measured by five key metrics: 1)
throughput at the final approach fix; 2) aircraft
kinetic energy; 3) number of violation of speed and
altitude constraints; 4) Spacing interval variation at
the merge point and at the final approach fix; and 5)
variation in speed and altitude along the descent. The
human factors performance was primarily measured
by the workload and situation awareness ratings.
III.C. Participants
Eight ATP pilots and two air traffic controllers
participated each week of the two-week experiment.
However, only data collected during the second week
of this experiment is reported in this paper, due to
equipment failure and malfunction occurred during
the first week of the experiment. The  flight
time experience is summarized in Table 2 below [18].
Five of the eight second-week pilots were Captains
and  three  were  First  Officers.  Three  pilots  had
previous experience flying CDAs but none of them
had experience with merging and spacing operations.
The two second-week controllers were retired, radar
certified controllers, with 25 and 34 years of civilian
air traffic control experience.
Table 2. Pilot flight hours
Total hours flown
as a line-pilot
N Total hours flown in N
1-1000 1 1-1000 4
1001-3000 0 1001-3000 1
3001-5000 4 3001-5000 3
>5000 3 >5000 0
III.D. Simulation Equipment
The HITL simulation used PC desktop-based
single pilot and controller stations equipped with the
Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) and the
Cockpit Situation Display (CSD) simulation software
applications developed by NASA Ames Research
Flight Deck Display Research Laboratory (FDDRL)
respectively.  MACS and CSD interfaces, shown in
Figures 3 and 4, are connected and supported by a
number of supplementary communication and
networking applications.  The MACS controller
display is an emulation of current day controller
stations with a ground-based automated conflict
probe tool that can automatically detect and alert
controllers of impending conflicts. When part of their
roles and responsibilities, controllers resolved
conflicts, and resequenced aircraft, with a trial
planner tool that they could use to graphically
generate a new proposed trajectory, and then datalink
the selected route modifications to the pilot.   The
CSD (shown in 2D mode in Figure 3) provided pilots
with  a  display  of  traffic  and  weather,  plus  CD&R
tools, flight path replanning tools, and interval
management tools. The CSD provided an adjustable
view of traffic, providing a 20-640 nm horizontal
range, 2000 to 80000 feet vertical range,
continuously adjustable 3D perspective views, and
simulated airborne weather displays. The CSD could
display all information in 2D (top down or profile) or
in 3D views. The CSD also included an integrated
trial planner, called the Route Assessment Tool
Figure 3.  CSD interface display
Figure 4.  MACS interface Display
(RAT). his
design new flight paths by stretching the route around
weather. In Concepts 1 and 2 automated conflict
alerting algorithms provided visual alerts when
proposed routes created traffic conflicts. The RAT
also provided feedback on how much delay the
reroute generated. The CSD was integrated with the
FMS allowing the pilot to execute the new route from
the CSD.  To alleviate controller workload, hand-offs
and voice frequency changes were automated and
check-ins were only required during merging and
spacing operations. For controllers, IFR traffic was
illuminated while TFR traffic was dimmed, unless in
conflict with an IFR aircraft (in Concept 2).
III.E. Distributed and Networked Simulation
The simulation was distributed and networked
over the internet with operators and/or participants
located at different sites.  Pilot stations and
simulation management and other support stations
were hosted in the FDDRL at the NASA Ames
Research Center, while the two controllers and
multiple ghost-controllers were located in the Center
for Human Factors in Advanced Aeronautics
Technologies (CHAAT) at California State
University Long Beach (CSULB).  Ghost-controllers
controlled ghost-sectors , which are airspace sectors
adjacent to experimental sectors. Ghost sectors
provide the airspace needed to facilitate the initiation
and completion of hand-offs between sectors. Ghost-
controller stations were operated by students and
pseudo-pilots
were located at the Systems Engineering Research
Laboratory (SERL) at California State University
Northridge (CSUN) and at the Human Integrated
Systems Engineering Laboratory (HISEL) at Purdue
University.  Pseudo-pilot stations were operated by
awareness and workload probes administered at 3-
minute intervals asked both pilots and controllers to
subjectively rate their workload and answer
descriptive questions about their situation awareness.
The readers are referred to [18-19, 21] for more
details.
Figure 5. Throughput at CHRCL
IV. Results and Discussion
Measures were submitted to a 3 (Concepts) x 2
(Display Type) repeated measures ANOVA via IBM
SPSS 20.0. Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments were
made for violations of sphericity when needed.  The
3*IQR outlier test was used for all variables.
Outliers were replaced with the means of the design
cells in which they occurred.  As noted above, due to
data-collection equipment failure and malfunction
occurred during the first week of the experiment,
only data collected during the second week of this
experiment is reported in this section.
IV.A. System Performance
To assess the feasibility of the function
allocation concepts, the performance of the system
was examined with five key metrics: 1) throughput at
the final approach fix; 2) aircraft kinetic energy; 3)
spacing interval variation at the merge point and at
the final approach fix; 4) variation in speed and
altitude along the descent; and 5) number of violation
of speed and altitude constraints.  These metrics
provide the basis for examining the system
efficiency, stability, robustness to the en route
weather perturbation, and compliance with safety
constraints.
Throughput
The throughput (in planes per hour) for each
concept was measured at the final approach fix,
CHRCL, and shown in Figure 5.  The difference in
the throughput was significant [F (2, 9) = 5.764, p <
0.05]. The throughput of Concept 1 was higher than
those of Concepts 2 and 3, and is very close to the
target throughput of 34.3 planes/hour (105 sec in trail
spacing) designed into the experiment.
Aircraft kinetic energy
The kinetic energy (KE) of the aircraft, shown in
Figure 6, was calculated for the continuous descent
approach (CDA) phase with the assumption that their
masses are the same. In general, pilots were able to
adhere to the target altitude profile but had trouble
managing their speed. This translated into poor
energy management as shown in Figure 6, where the
energy is too low in Concept 2 and somewhat high in
Concept 3. Concept 3 was found to have significantly
higher kinetic energy than Concepts 1 and 2 from
CBSKT to CHRCL. In Concept 3, pilots were able to
decrease the aircraft energy at CHRCL to the same
level as in Concept 1. From SLEWW onward,
Concept 2 was found to have the lowest kinetic
energy.
Figure 6. Mean descent KE across Concepts
The poor energy management can be further
elucidated by examining mean KE target deviation
shown in Figure 7. In all concepts, at the waypoint
CBSKT, KE was severely off the target KE profile.
This is especially significant for Concept 3, which
had marginally higher deviation throughout the
descent. deviation drops significantly
after CBSKT and remains below target until
CHRCL. Concept 1 maintained least deviation from
the target KE profile, particularly at CHRCL ( KE =
0.23 MJ).
Figure 7. Mean KE deviation across Concepts
Spacing
Comparatively, the average spacing was
significantly tighter in Concept 1 than in Concept 3 at
all waypoints from CBSKT to CHRCL (p < .05), and
closer to the target 105 seconds (See Figure 8).  Mean
spacing was significantly different between Concepts
2 and 3 only at CBSKT.
Figure 8. Mean Spacing across Concepts
Altitude and Speed Profiles, and Constraint
Violations
For all waypoints along the descent, no
significant differences in altitude were found across
concepts. Altitude restriction violations were also
calculated, but were relatively low for all concepts.
Altitude target deviations did not exceed 80 feet for
any waypoint in any concept. As illustrated in Figure
9, altitude across concepts was managed in a
consistent and stable manner.
Figure 9. Altitude Profiles
The means of the indicated airspeed (IAS) of the
three concepts are shown in Figure 10.   Along the
CDA path from CBSKT to CHRCL (see Figure 1), a
speed restriction is defined as a deviation of ± 10
knots speed constraint (except at
CHRCL  where  there  is  no  lower  limit).   Table  3
shows the total violations at each waypoint with a
breakdown of above and below deviations.  Concept
2 had the highest number of violations, most of
which were violations of the lower limit. Concept 3
had the second most violations, but these violations
were mostly attributed to breaking the upper limit.
These results agree with findings of higher mean IAS
in Concept 3 and lower mean IAS in Concept 2, as
shown in Figure 5. Analysis of IAS showed
significant differences between Concepts 1 and 3 at
CBSKT (F(1.133, 7.930) = 11.219, p < 0.01).  Speed
was higher throughout the descent from CBSKT to
CHRCL for Concept 3 than for Concepts 1 and 2.
Although aircraft were generally able to slow down
and match the target profile by CHRCL, the
consequence of carrying high energy did result in
three upper limit speed violations at CHRCL in
Concept 3, while both Concepts 1 and 2 had none.
This highlights a critical shortcoming of Concept 3 in
that it could not prevent more than 9% of the aircraft
from violating an upper IAS limit at the final
profile at CBSKT, but distinctly fell below Concept 1
at SLEWW (F(2, 14) = 54.005, p < 0.001).  Concept
2 fell below the target profile, and had low speeds at
CHRCL.  Based on number of violations, Concept
e target speed
profile with better precision than the Concept 3 and
Concept 2 aircraft.
Figure 10. Mean descent IAS across Concepts
Table 3. Number of IAS Restriction Violations
Concept 1 Concept 2 Concept 3
Above 18 15 56
Below 37 62 4
Total 55 77 60
IV.B. Situation Awareness and Workload
The results on pilot and controller situation
awareness and workload have been reported in a
number of papers [18, 19, 21] and will only be
summarized here.  In general, it was found that pilots
had the highest situation awareness in Concept 1
(Pilot Primary), when they were most actively
engaged in and responsible for separation assurance.
Conversely, pilots showed lowest situation awareness
when they were least engaged in separation assurance
in Concept 3 (Automation Primary). Workload was
more dependent on the flight phase than function
allocation concept, but trends in multiple workload
metrics indicated that pilots had lowest workload
when they are responsible for resolving traffic
conflicts. This finding suggested that, for pilots,
increases in workload were driven more by gaining
situational awareness than by higher separation
assurance responsibility. Controllers experienced
highest workload in Concept 2 (Controller Primary)
where they had the highest level of responsibility,
and lowest workload in Concept 3 (Automation
Primary).  Overall, both pilots and controllers
indicated in post-simulation questionnaires that all
three concepts were workable and that they are
comfortable with the concepts.
IV.C. Discussion
Robustness to weather perturbation
As shown in Figure 1, it was anticipated that the
weather cells prior to the TOD and the merge point
PRINC would disrupt the aircraft flow and create
substantial variation in the initial conditions of the
aircraft  by  the  time  they  reach  TOD  or  PRINC.
However, previous analyses have shown that for all
concepts there were no significant differences from
the baseline profiles and no significant variation in
terms of IAS, altitude, and KE at the TOD and the
merge point PRINC [18].  That is, aircraft in each
concept converged to a common flight state and had
comparable initial conditions at the start of the CDA.
The performance data from these previous
examinations of this data (in terms of frequency with
which aircraft entered and time spent in weather
cells,  time  to  pass  weather  and  to  reach  TOD,  the
number of aircraft out of sequence or needing re-
sequence, the number of spacing disengagement, and
path stretch around weather cells) converged in
showing that there was no significant differences in
how pilots avoided the weather.   The similar and
comparable initial conditions at the TOD helped the
aircraft tightly track the altitude profile without any
statistically significant variations across all concepts
as shown in Figure 9.    Collectively these finding
suggests that all concepts are robust to weather
perturbation and performed comparably with one
another.
System Performance
Based on the throughput and energy management and
constraint violation results, pilot performance in
Concept 1 (pilot primary) was superior to pilot
performance in Concepts 2 (controller primary) and 3
(automation primary).  However, it is interesting to
note that upon beginning the descent, the pilots are
no longer responsible for separation assurance
because this responsibility was assigned to the
controller in all concepts. In light of the findings
from [18] mentioned above, that all concepts had
comparable flight states at TOD and at the merge
point, this suggests that the significant differences in
throughput and energy management and violation of
constraints are most likely due to the different
degrees of pilot -the- involvement in
managing the spacing and the flight profile during the
CDA.  With Concept 1, because pilots were assigned
the separation responsibility before the CDA, they
naturally would be actively involved in using the
spacing tool to manage the spacing and in managing
the descent even when they are no longer responsible
for the separation. Consequently, they have the
highest level of situation awareness among the
concepts. With Concept 2, because the pilots had
secondary responsibility in managing the separation
before the CDA, they would be partially involved in
managing spacing and the descent.  Likewise, the
controller was also not as actively involved in the
loop because the spacing algorithm already handled
the spacing between the aircraft and the controller
only had to intervene when the spacing is projected to
decrease below the minimum required separation.
With concept 3, because the pilots were not at all
involved in the separation prior to the CDA, they
would further fa -of-the-
This is evidenced in the lowest situation awareness
that pilots had for this concept.
V. Conclusions
A key research issue of great interest to NextGen
researchers and developers is the design of viable
separation assurance concepts.  While the results of
this study are applicable to the conditions designed
and manipulated in the experiment, they have a
number of implications with respect to the design of
the allocation of separation assurance responsibility
between pilots, controllers, and automation.  First,
although the operation was stressed with severe
weather disruption, all three concepts were robust to
this perturbation in the presence of 3-time higher than
current day traffic density.  In combination, the
system performance data and situation awareness and
workload data, point to a general conclusion that all
concepts are workable for the pilots and controllers.
Thus, in the design of NextGen operational concepts,
this study suggests that these three function allocation
concepts are viable design alternatives that deserve
further study or consideration for integration with
other NextGen concepts such as Trajectory Operation
or Trajectory Based Operation [1].  In the context of
these concepts, it would be essential to further
explore system performance under a number of
newly proposed TO/TBO system architectural
elements such as required time performance, open
and closed trajectories, and dynamic windows (i.e.,
allowed flexibility in 4D trajectory).  These new
elements and concepts form a paradigm to facilitate
conformance monitoring both on the flight deck and
on the ground, and present new challenges in terms
of designing operation procedures and display
systems for conformance monitoring and alerting
under TO/TBO.
Second, the results corroborate the fundamental
automation design principle that the best form of
automation design is one that involves the operator in
the loop. This view is supported by this study,
showing effects even though the required
participation of the pilots was the same by the time
they began the arrival phase. Because Concept 1(i.e.,
pilot primary) requires pilots to be actively engaged
in-the-loop  with separation assurance, it appears to
motivate the pilots to continue to maintain this
involvement even when they are no longer required
to. In contrast, because Concepts 2 (controller
primary) and Concept 3 (automation primary) take
the pilots out-of-the-loop to a greater extent than
Concept 1, the performance under these concepts are
inferior to Concept 1.
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